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ABSTRACT 
 
Explanations of the coexistence of conflict and cooperation in the 
employment relationship are often vague and-or misleading. Authors have 
frequently failed to distinguish between institutional bases for cooperation and 
the ideological orientations of employers and employees. Previous theorizing has 
typically presented cross-sectional views where the employment relationship is 
presented outside of its temporal context. Here it is argued that the extent and 
nature of conflict and cooperation between employers and their workforce 
should be understood through appreciating that interest alignment changes as an 
employment relationship moves from a short to a long term. In practice, the 
institutional basis for conflict mostly exists in the short and long term and 
cooperation in the long term exclusively. Using survey data obtained from fast 
food workers, the theoretical and strategic consequences of this view are 
explored in relation to new employment forms which have a modified concept of 
a long term. 
 
 
he employment relationship is a bedrock institution in capitalist 
market economies. However, bosses and their workforces are bound 
together in an association which has an appearance of fragility and a 
conspicuous potential for frequent, and perhaps irresolvable, conflict.  The 
origins of this vulnerability appear to arise from certain elements where capital 
and labour have opposing interests.  Such elements may include: control over the 
way tasks are performed, employee pay rates and non-pay related benefits and, 
motivation and incentive provisions. In spite of corrosive influences such as 
these, the employment relationship exists in perpetuity and bosses mostly 
maintain a productive and cooperative association with their workforce.  
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In this article it is argued that the coexistence of conflict and cooperation in 
the employment relationship can be better understood if elapsed time is seen as 
causing reasons for greater cooperation between bosses and their workforces. For 
current purposes, a time-based view will be defined as a perspective which 
emphasizes that elements which give rise to conflict and cooperation between 
capital and labour do not reveal themselves simultaneously. For example, a 
worker commencing a job may have little interest in whether their employing 
entity still exists in ten years time but will probably be concerned about their 
initial pay cheque and the extent to which their boss is inclined to watch over 
their shoulder. In these circumstances, the differing interests of each party seem 
especially prominent. On the other hand, months or years later, the same worker 
may be concerned about their employing entity’s ongoing existence, an issue 
which will also be important to the employer. A time based view of the 
employment relationship cannot exist without a hypothetical understanding of 
the short and long term. These concepts imply that, for each job, employers and 
their employees have a shared implicit understanding that there will be a period 
in the immediate future when reciprocal obligations and responsibilities are to be 
fulfilled. This period, the short-term, is not necessarily discussed but implicitly 
forms part of a psychological contract between the parties. It may be weeks or 
months. Beyond the short-term is the long-term.  
A time-based perspective of conflict and cooperation in the employment 
relationship develops static or cross-sectional views which are widespread in 
scholarly literature (e.g., Purcell and Sisson, 1983; Deaton, 1985, Purcell, 1986; 
Purcell, 1987; Sisson, 1989; Marchington and Parker, 1990; McLoughlin and 
Gourlay, 1992; Bacon and Storey, 1993; Belanger and Edwards, 2007). Such 
established theory typically implies that employers and employees exist in 
harmony because the bases for cooperation are more numerous and/or more 
important than the bases for non-cooperation. Static views may also imply that 
employees cooperate with their boss because it is the “least unattractive” option 
for them. Even though workers may resent having to subjugate certain of their 
interests, they need their job and compete for employment in a labour market on 
the basis of potential and actual compliance, amongst other things. In this 
context, fulfillment of contractual obligations evolves into beyond-contract style 
cooperation. Although such reasoning, henceforth referred to as the static 
perspective, is intuitively appealing, a theory based on elapsed time has a 
specific contemporary application. For example, it is possible to use a “time-
based” view to examine whether there is diminished employee cooperation in 
new and/or non-standard employment forms. Such work can be considered to 
have either no long-term; and/or a more abstract long-term; and/or compressed 
short and long-term time horizons. If non-standard employment is associated 
with diminished cooperation then, when employers offer these jobs, they make a 
trade-off between having labour flexibility and beyond contract commitment 
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from employees. Underlying both the static perspective and a time-based view of 
the employment relationship is the notion of interest alignment. Interest 
alignment emphasizes that employers and employees each have a set of interests. 
Certain of these, the aligned interests, are the same or similar for each party, and 
others, the misaligned interests, are different and may be at odds.  
This article is in three parts. First, an overview of static/cross-sectional theory 
about conflict and cooperation in the employment relationship is presented. This 
discussion highlights two generic weaknesses and presents an alternative view— 
focusing on time—as a proposed remedy.  Second, evidence is presented that the 
industrial-age model of the employment relationship has partially splintered into 
a spectrum of new employment forms (atypical work) which either eliminate or 
modify conceptions of the long-term. Third, data is presented which suggests 
that, in the case of teenaged casual fast food workers, conceptions of the long-
term are altered in a way that has foreseeable consequences for conflict and 
cooperation in the employment relationship. Throughout the article the terms 
static view, time-based view, conflict, cooperation, interest alignment, and short 
and long-term will be used regularly. These terms have been defined broadly in 
this section, the introduction, but will be redefined more narrowly when the 
need arises.  
 
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN CAPITALIST MARKET ECONOMIES  
 
Conflict and cooperation are key objects of analysis in employment relations 
(Kochan, 1998, p. 37). Fox’s Beyond Contract (1974) and his conception of 
pluralism have influenced this research focus. Pluralism arose in Western 
countries in the 1930s as a management philosophy which aimed to change the 
role of unions from rivals to partners (Fox, 1974, p. 256). More recently, it has 
become an umbrella-term for perspectives of the employment relationship which 
view employee challenge of management prerogative as legitimate, inevitable 
but, nonetheless, manageable (for example, see Purcell’s 1987 conception labour 
management strategy which draws on the idea of pluralism). The term is 
inextricably linked with the notion of conflict between employers and 
employees. If a manager regards themselves—or at least operates—as a pluralist, 
they will approach labour management with a spirit of compromise on the basis 
that employee demands are sometimes justifiable even when they are at odds 
with employer interests.  In the modern era, there are practical and ethical 
reasons why Western managers are inclined to be pluralists. For example, in 
most jurisdictions, unions are constituted as legal entities and employees have 
rights which are not necessarily compatible with employer requirements. Indeed, 
a management orientation towards pluralism is a baseline assumption of much 
theory about conflict and cooperation in the employment relationship; including 
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theory which implies that certain managers may be anti-union or may oppose 
employees having partnership status (e.g., Purcell, 1987).1  
Post-Fox theory in the pluralist genre has emerged which distinguishes 
between circumstances promoting mere employee compliance and which foster 
commitment and dedication. There are two kinds of conceptual frameworks in 
this literature: those addressing employer strategy and planning (e.g., Storey and 
Bacon, 1993 pp. 665-683; Purcell, 1987 pp. 533-548); and those that are 
theoretical/analytical and without an obvious implication for competitive 
advantage (e.g., Bain and Clegg, 1974 p. 98).  
Irrespective of whether a particular conceptualization is appropriately 
classified as mostly strategic or mostly analytic in its focus, Post-Foxian pluralist 
models have two primary characteristics. First, they portray conflict as arising 
from a misalignment of interests between employers and employees. In so doing, 
they typically depict certain of the overall benefits of the employment 
relationship as being zero-sum in nature. This means that—with respect to the 
benefits in question—one party is advantaged at the expense of the other. Such 
elements include apportionment of profit; control over work methods; and 
investment in motivation systems and strategies (Keenoy and Kelly, 1999 pp. 63-
84). For example, in many work settings, an employee can only be paid more 
from a surplus which would otherwise belong to an employer; employers retain 
a workforce because they cannot do everything themselves and, to the chagrin of 
employees, are inclined to control how tasks are performed; and, employers 
invest resources in non-pecuniary incentive schemes.2 The second characteristic 
of post-Foxian models is that they conceive of cooperation as occurring in relation 
to a limited range of aspects of work where there is alignment of employer and 
employee interests. The benefits of these elements are inherently positive-sum in 
nature. Hence, insofar as pursuit of certain goals is concerned, each party can 
simultaneously create advantage for themselves and their counterpart. For 
example, it could be argued that if either an employer or employee acted in a 
way that tended to ensure the long-term existence of the employing enterprise, 
such behaviour would be in the other party’s interests. Also, if an employee has 
the prospect of a career within an organization, it may be in that employee’s 
interests to increase the probability of realizing such an opportunity. The 
worker’s actions arising from this motivation could incidentally be compatible 
with their employer’s interests.  
Strategy and theory oriented scholarship addressing conflict and cooperation 
in the employment relationship may pursue either or both of two objectives. The 
first of these concerns establishing elements where parties have aligned interests.  
Although the debate about what is best viewed as the basis of convergent 
interests has spawned long-standing disagreement, the task itself is easy to 
appreciate. It can be encapsulated in two questions. How should a job be 
deconstructed into its constituent parts? Which of these give rise to aligned 
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employer/employee interests? Difference of opinion concerning answers to these 
questions has been an influence on the emergence of distinct industrial relations 
and human resources perspectives of the employment relationship (Alexander 
and Lewer, 2004 p. 21). In the contested terrain of aligned versus misaligned 
interests, proponents of HRM see greater convergence and/or develop narratives 
which recast divergent elements as convergent. An example of this recasting 
process would be to suggest that employee remuneration is not an element 
where there is misalignment of interests because higher pay rates compromise 
the viability of an employing entity, a condition that is in neither party’s 
interests. The second objective of post-Fox literature, and the focus of this article, 
concerns how conflict and cooperation can coexist in an ongoing employment 
relationship. This matter, henceforth referred to as the coexistence problem, is 
often obscured by related concerns which address optimization of the benefits of 
the employment relationship for either or both of its parties. These other 
concerns include: how can conflicting interests be resolved (e.g., Kochan, 1998 p. 
38); how can inherently ambiguous employment contracts influence compromise 
(e.g., Smith, 2006 pp. 389-402); and, what are the optimal conditions for capital 
and labour to work with each other (e.g., Wright, 2004 pp. 957-1002). The 
coexistence problem is difficult to present as a closed research question.3 The 
nature of the issue can be understood through asking an open-ended question: 
how is it that, in spite of seemingly overwhelming reasons for conflict between 
its two parties, the employment relationship can exist in perpetuity whereas 
other kinds of voluntary human relationships require mostly cooperation?  
Existing commentary about the coexistence problem tends to be plagued by 
two kinds of related weakness. The first of these is that it often glosses over the 
dilemma of the simultaneous existence of conflict and cooperation with glib or 
ambiguous assertions. For example the British Prime Minister, in his foreword to 
the nation’s Department of Trade and Industry White Paper (1998) addressing 
Fairness at Work said: 
 
This (initiative) is part of the government’s program to replace the notion of conflict between 
employers and employees [and] goes far beyond legal changes and is nothing less than a 
change to a culture of better relations in and at work. 
 
When Mr. Blair made this speech he appeared to assume that, if conflict can 
be reduced or eliminated, workers will be more productive and perhaps happier. 
It is not clear whether this is the case. For example, labour process theory has 
revealed that it is possible for firms to be profitable despite substantial conflict 
between bosses and their workforces (e.g., Burawoy, 1979). On the other hand, 
there has been an ongoing preoccupation with reducing conflict in the 
employment relationship, particularly from those who practice human resource 
management (Storey, 1995).  Before this issue can be confidently tackled, there 
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are at least two more preliminary matters to consider. First, why do conflict and 
cooperation seem to be side-by-side in the employment relationship? Second, are 
there ways that managers or policy makers can manipulate understanding of the 
employment relationship to reduce conflict? In his forward, the Prime Minister 
jumped straight to the second of these matters. Without a solid theoretical base, it 
is hard to have confidence that his ideas will reduce conflict and increase 
cooperation. The opposite problem is seen in the work of Ackers and Payne 
(1998). These authors do not say how to achieve greater cooperation and less 
conflict between managers and employees but list many reasons why it is 
unlikely to occur in a relationship that they view as inherently adversarial and 
perhaps fatally flawed. 
Aside from politicians, scholars have had difficulty being precise about why 
conflict and cooperation can coexist in perpetuity in the employer/employee 
relationship. For example, Smith (2006 pp. 389-400) explores how the 
indeterminate nature of the employment contract tends to make each party 
emphasis misaligned interests.  In practice, where an employee is unsure about 
their rights or responsibilities, they are more inclined to ensure that they are not 
exploited and that they get what they can from their employer. This view may 
help to lessen conflict or, at least make it less likely to be obvious in the short 
term. However, the conception only says that conflict is increased when 
expectations are not clear, a somewhat tangential consideration when it comes to 
understanding why the employment relationship exists in perpetuity when there 
appear to be reasons why this should be the case.  
The second kind of weakness in certain coexistence problem theory is that it 
is inclined to offer complex explanations of how and why conflict and 
cooperation may occur together and presents models which obscure underlying 
processes. A key element of this limitation is failure to differentiate between 
institutional bases for cooperation between workers and their bosses and the 
attitudes and ideological orientations of the parties themselves. For example, 
Belanger and Edwards (2006 pp. 713-734) describe control and developmental 
concerns4 as each being independently varying for capital and labour. This 
conceptualization suggests the theoretical possibility that employers always have 
high control concerns but that such concerns may be either high or low for 
employees. Although the Belanger and Edwards article provides case-study 
evidence of employees with low-control concerns, an alternative interpretation of 
their findings would be that some employees have these needs to a lesser extent 
than others.5 If this is so, the overall formulation simplifies to a state-of-affairs 
where employers always want to control the way work is done and so do 
employees. Hence, control of the execution of tasks at work is fundamentally a 
feature of employment where parties have misaligned interests, a point already 
made by Keenoy and Kelly (1999 pp. 68-74). On the other hand, the second of 
Belanger and Edwards variables—development concerns—is depicted as able to 
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take on either high or low values for both employers and employees. The data 
they present about this matter may belie the presence of another phenomenon. 
An employee cannot have high dedicated6 development concerns unless and 
until they decide, or it seems likely, that they will remain in their job. Therefore, 
such a concern will mostly be identified and manifest in the long term. In 
summary, when viewed purely as a device for understanding employee 
objective-motivation7 for going “beyond contract”, the Belanger/Edwards model 
defaults to a less complicated conceptualization: employers and employees both 
want to control the way the job is done whereas development is always the 
concern of the employer but only becomes relevant to certain employees in the 
long term. Although—as Belanger and Edwards have done—it is possible to 
obtain findings suggesting other combinations8, such other results do not seem 
especially relevant to understanding systemic employer/employee interest 
alignment and say little about institutional pressures for conflict and 
cooperation. These other combinations are possibly artefacts of workplace 
culture and/or the attitudes and ideological orientations of parties to the 
employment relationship. In this article it is suggested that complex explanations 
of the coexistence problem often portray the simultaneous presence of conflict 
and cooperation in a way that obscures the fundamental nature of the 
phenomenon. A reason for this is that models frequently attempt to reconcile 
pertinent causal influences using a cross-sectional or static paradigm. However, a 
variable that is implicit in the Belanger and Edwards conceptualization is time. 
This factor is critical to understanding the simultaneous presence of conflict and 
cooperation in the employment relationship and is the focus of the remainder of 
this section. 
The employment relationship exists in time; a notion which implies, for 
present purposes, that the association between each of its parties has a short and 
long term. This application of the idea of time is an outgrowth of Urry’s (2000, 
pp. 105-135) conceptualization which distinguishes between instantaneous time 
and clock time. According to this view, instantaneous time operates in the 
present. It can be considered as a person’s reflections on what has happened and 
what is likely to happen. It embodies the ides of subjectivity and salience. An 
example of instantaneous time would be important milestones in a person’s 
career. By contrast, clock time is independent of a person’s personal reflections 
and can be defined by preset regulations which dictate what is important and/or 
salient. An example of clock time would be the inauguration dates of American 
Presidents. Insofar as the present study is concerned, the notion of short/long-
term will be considered as a special case of instantaneous time because, rather 
than being merely a personal reflection, it is a reflection that is shared by parties 
to the employment relationship. Henceforth, reference to short and long-term 
will imply that bosses and their workforce see their future relationship as 
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consisting of two distinct sets of expectations, obligations and problems to be 
solved; those pertaining to the near and distant future.  
Appreciation of the time dimension enables a better understanding of the 
development of conflict and cooperation; the coexistence problem. Time is, at 
least, as relevant to analyzing how the employment relationship functions as 
economic, social and legal considerations; dimensions that are routinely 
considered to provide the entire context for formulating understanding of the 
capitalist market employer/employee association (Keenoy and Kelly, 1999 pp. 
372-379).  
The argument presented here about the impact of time on the employment 
relationship is based on six tenets. Table 1 lists these and provides relevant 
examples and/or further explanation.  
 
Table 1:  
The Six Tenets of a Time-based View of Conflict and Cooperation in the Employment 
Relationship 
 
Tenet of the Theory Example and/or Further Explanation 
1.     Elements that give rise to 
conflict between employers and their 
workforce exist in the short and long 
term. 
Conflict about apportionment of an entity’s operating 
benefits (in practice an issue which is mostly about pay 
rates) is always present; that is, it exists in the short and the 
long term. 
2.     Elements that have potential to 
give rise to cooperation between the 
two parties exist in the long term 
only. 
Cooperation over an employing entity’s ongoing existence 
occurs mostly (or exclusively) in the long term. From an 
employee standpoint, cooperation can only be manifest 
from the point when a worker has made a decision to stay 
and they believe that they will be able to stay. 
3.     The employment relationship is 
between a single employer and an 
employee and not between a group 
of employers and an employee (i.e., 
it is not between an employee and 
the more abstract notion of an 
industry).9 
 
 
 
Examples and/or further explanations are not necessary. 
4.     The definitions of short term 
and long term vary according to job 
type. 
For some jobs, such as those involving teenaged fast food 
workers, parties may conceive of the short term as being 
days or weeks. In other instances, for example in the case 
of university lecturers, the short term may be years. These 
parameters are influenced by custom and practice, 
service/product delivery life cycles; and job training 
requirements. A job will have an extended “short-term” 
time horizon if both parties have an expectation of a 
lengthy relationship; services/products take more time to 
develop and deliver; and, employee training requirements 
are more extensive. 
5.     For a given employment 
relationship, the definitions of short 
and long term are implicitly agreed 
 
Examples and/or further explanations are not necessary. 
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upon and/or understood by each 
party. Such definitions are not 
usually discussed by either 
employers or employees. 
6.     In certain circumstances, 
alignment of employer and 
employee interests requires parties 
to make an investment when they 
are still in the short term phase of 
their relationship. 
In the case of employer sponsored training, employers 
invest in training their workforce so that employees can do 
their jobs better and/or undertake more complex tasks 
following the training regime. While the investment is 
being made, there is a misalignment of employer and 
employer interests because resources are being diverted to 
employee development. When the investment is completed 
and delivering a return, the misalignment of interests is 
replaced with relatively more alignment; the employee is 
doing a more interesting and sophisticated job and the boss 
is benefiting from this arrangement. 
 
The six tenets presented in Table 1 allow for elements of work which have 
hitherto been the subject of “interest alignment” analysis to be organized 
according to a new principle, time. Underlying this view is the idea—which is 
not new—that conflict is not necessarily overt but, when predominantly present, 
is habitually manifest as mere employee compliance (Kenoy and Kelly, 1999 p. 
373). In a case where the employment relationship is mostly plagued by conflict 
as opposed to cooperation, each of its parties has short-term motivations 
maintaining the association. For employees in these circumstances the 
motivation is primarily economic. In practice, they continue to do what they 
have to do to receive their next pay cheque. For employers in heightened conflict 
with their employees, the motivation is the imperative to achieve short-term 
worker compliance and low labour cost. They may pursue this objective through 
punitive human resources-related measures. An example of this state-of-affairs 
would be a boss who has a policy of firing employees who fail to show up for 
work.10 
Aside from being a classification mechanism, the six tenet conceptualization 
implies that capitalist market economies optimize employee benefits only in the 
long term, a notion largely overlooked in previous theorizing. This is because 
workers receive their greatest advantages from the employment relationship 
when their interests are maximally aligned with those of their employer. Until 
this point is reached, workers must defer to employer prerogative and, in the 
process, partially subjugate their interests. There are two kinds of causes 
impacting the possibility of long term alignment of interests between capital and 
labour: contrived and incidental. An example of contrived alignment is the case 
of employer sponsored training. In relation to this element, as previously 
discussed, both parties are overtly planning for congruency of needs. Incidental 
alignment is mostly unplanned. An example of unplanned incidental alignment 
would be the fact that both parties have an interest in the employing entity 
existing in perpetuity. In reflecting on congruence of objectives, tenet number 
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two is reiterated. This is the most important and says: whether it be planned or 
incidental, interest alignment typically occurs in the long term and therefore 
enhanced cooperation should be expected to also. The six tenet time-based model 
is a partial remedy for the two problems which beset literature addressing the 
coexistence problem: namely, “glossing over”, and “undue complication”. 
As with Post-Fox pluralist theory in the static/cross-sectional tradition, a 
time-based view of conflict and cooperation in the employment relationship 
could be used to develop hypotheses about industrial-age jobs. These jobs have 
the following characteristics: relatively long lasting employment relationships 
coupled with the prospect of careers based on length of service; continuous 
engagement in one physical setting with standardized hours, conditions, 
entitlements and benefits; tasks based around manufacturing or a related notion 
of physical production of goods; and, widely recognized sources of interest 
misalignment between capital and labour which are held in check through 
adoption of industrial relations-related institutions such as unions (Kalleberg, 
2000 p. 341). Somewhat unlike Post-Fox pluralist theory in the static/cross-
sectional tradition, it may be that a time-based view has special relevance to new 
employment forms. Such jobs are variously described as atypical/non-
standard/contingent/alternative work arrangements/market-mediated 
arrangements (Kalleberg, 2000 p. 341). Due to its modular short/long term focus, 
a time-based view can be used to appreciate how these new employment forms 
are potentially undermining the prospect of alignment of interests and making 
cooperation between employers and their workforce more difficult. The next 
section explores how the new economy has seen the industrial age model of the 
employment relationship partially splinter into forms of atypical work.  
 
NEW EMPLOYMENT FORMS AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
LONG-TERM 
 
The industrial age model of the employment relationship has partially 
splintered into non-standard employment forms. Such arrangements include 
regular part-timers, casual or temporary workers, agency employees, the self-
employed and independent contractors. The “splintering thesis” is well 
established and supported by empirical evidence. For example in the United 
States, the ratio of temporary full-time equivalent workers to the total labour 
force increased from one percent in 1992 to two percent in 2002 (Mishel, 
Bernstein, Shierholz, 2009 p. 255).11 In Great Britain, the proportion of workplaces 
with part-time workers increased sporadically through the 1990s. It rose from 17 
percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2004 (Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix 
and Oxenbridge, 2006 p. 78). This project revealed a trend, at least in Great 
Britain, towards use of fixed or limited tenure contracts to supply labour for core 
workplace functions. Such a result does not support the core/periphery model of 
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workforce management which predicts that spikes in demand for labour are met 
with non-standard employment contracts (Cully, Woodland, Riley and Dix, 1999 
pp.38-39). Rather, it seems that alternative work contracts in certain labour 
market sectors are being used increasingly to fulfill basic functions.  
Because non-standard work forms are generally of shorter duration than 
industrial-age model employment, aggregate measures of the mean number of 
years within the same job provides a useful general measure of its growth rate. 
For example, in 2006, United States workers aged between 35 and 44 had an 
average of 6.6 years in the same job. In 1973 this figure was 7.5 (Mishel, et al, 2009 
p. 253).  Although such a result may seem trivial, when the same analysis is 
carried out on one segment of the labour market, for example United States 
workers aged 25-34 with no tertiary education, the disparity is more pronounced: 
4.3 years in 1973 and 3.6 years in 2006 (Mishel, et al, 2009 p.253).  
Notwithstanding factors such as fluctuations in workforce participation and 
unemployment rates, it appears that, in the years since the 1970s, there has been 
an overall increase in job and employer “switching” and a specific growth in 
non-standard work. There are supply and demand-related reasons for the 
proliferation of new employment forms. Employees may want to achieve a better 
work life balance and accommodate their job commitments whilst pursuing a 
multifaceted lifestyle. On the other hand, employers frequently cite efficiency 
and flexibility considerations as rationale for creating new employment forms 
(Mishel, et al, 2009 p.252). Insofar as the present analysis is concerned, one issue 
in particular is pertinent: what happens to the conception of a job’s long-term in 
non-standard employment forms? This is relevant to conflict and cooperation 
because, as suggested in the six tenet conceptualization, employer/employee 
interests are optimally aligned in the long term only. If this is so, another more 
controversial question is suggested: can there be any prospect of beyond 
contract-style cooperation in non-standard work?  
 
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN JOBS WITHOUT A LONG TERM 
 
In the previous section evidence was presented that the industrial age 
manifestation of the employment relationship has partially splintered into new 
employment forms. It was noted that these offshoots typically involve employers 
and their workforce in conventional associations of shorter duration than was 
once the case. In this section, the six tenet theory is used to test hypotheses about 
conflict and cooperation between fast food workers and their employer. 
Although the fast food industry has existed for almost 60 years, its outlet jobs are 
widely viewed as a new employment form because of who does them, their 
employment contractual arrangements, and the tasks which they entail (Leidner, 
1993 pp. 30-80). In the Western world, the sector uses casual and part-time 
workers; has a service oriented culture; and, has large numbers of female crew 
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(Bamber, Park, Lee, Ross and Broadbent, 2000 p. 27). Workers are typically 
young, poorly informed about their rights and have high rates of turnover 
(Gould, 2009, pp. 376-79). Fast food employers typically organise work according 
to principles of scientific management (Royle, 2000 pp. 2-8). It is alleged that they 
misuse such principles in an effort to manipulate and control employee emotions 
and style of interacting with co-workers and customers (Leidner, 1993 pp. 30-80). 
In these latter respects, fast food work has the worst characteristics of low-skilled 
atypical employment (Kalleberg, 2000 p. 341).  
Often fast food workers are teenagers who may not expect or want to have a 
career in the industry. On the other hand, data suggests that a large minority of 
teenaged fast food workers do want and/or expect to have a career in the sector 
(Gould, 2009 p. 376). This finding has utility for the present analysis because, 
although fast work may be considered a new employment form, some employees 
make it a career and the majority of fast food managers and executives once 
worked behind a counter (e.g., Gould, 2010, in print).  
Table 2 presents data obtained from casual teenaged fast food (non-
management) workers employed at suburban McDonald’s outlets throughout 
Australia. These employees were asked to respond to Likert-Scale survey items 
focusing on cooperative behaviour and job perceptions. Participant responses are 
disaggregated by desire to have a career at McDonald’s specifically and, more 
generally, in the fast food industry.12 Findings are further disaggregated by 
length of service.13 Approximately equal numbers of male and female teenaged 
participants took part in the survey.  
If a trend towards atypical work characteristically involves a job that was 
previously done by a single employee over months or years now being done by 
several employees over days or weeks, the question arises: what has happened to 
the concept of the “long-term”? There are potentially three answers to this 
question which can be presented as hypotheses. First, it does not exist in new 
employment forms (hypothesis A). Second, it has been replaced with a more 
abstract notion (hypothesis B). Third, its definition has changed (hypothesis C). 
Each hypothesis has different implications for alignment of employer and 
employee interests and hence for conflict and cooperation.  Hypotheses will be 
discussed with reference to Table 2’s data.14  
Hypothesis A says that, in certain new employment forms, both employers 
and employees have implicit awareness that they are in a relationship which is 
configured to exist in the short term only. The six tenet representation suggests 
that, without a long-term, there can be no realistic prospect of genuine 
cooperation. Such a state would mostly predict employee compliance due to 
institutional conflict being held in check through punitive human resources-
related practices (the “you’re fired” — syndrome) and employee economic 
necessity (need for a paycheque). 
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Table 2:  
Perceptions of Work and Career by McDonald’s Employees 
 
 Sample of McDonald’s Workers at Suburban Australian Outlets Who 
Indicate a Preference about Wanting to Work in the Fast Food Industry in 
Five Years Time( i.e., “do” or “do not” want to work in the fast food 
industry in five years time) (n=655)* 
Crew Who Want to Have a Career in the Fast 
Food Industry (n=293)* 
Crew Who Do Not 
Want to Have a Career 
in the Fast Food 
Industry (including at 
McD’s) (n=362)* 
At McDs 
(specifically)  
(n=261) 
In the FF Industry 
(including McD’s) 
(n=293) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
less than 
two years 
(n=199) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
more than 
two years 
(n=62) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
less than 
two years 
(n= 207) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
more than 
two years 
(n=86) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
less than 
two years 
(n=304) 
Who have 
worked in 
the job for 
more than 
two years 
(n=58) 
1.    When a 
problem occurs at 
work I would 
prefer to deal with 
it without asking 
my manager 
(m=3.07) 
m=2.96 m=3.41 m=3.01 m=3.56 m=2.96 m=2.98 
2.    I enjoy the 
challenge of 
dealing with 
unusual situations 
at work (m=3.71) 
m=3.69 m=3.74 m=3.68 m=3.76 m=3.66 m=3.70 
3.    When I minor 
problem occurs at 
work, I deal with 
it without taking it 
to my manager 
(m=3.33) 
m=3.33 m=3.56 m=3.32 m=3.59 m=3.09 m=3.08 
4.    I am paid 
according to my 
individual work 
performance 
(m=2.56) 
m=2.61 m=2.69 m=2.63 m=2.71 m=2.41 m=2.38 
5.    If I do a good 
job I will be 
offered more 
hours of work 
(m=3.07) 
m=3.07 m=3.31 m=3.09 m=3.36 m=2.97 m=2.94 
6.    Managers at 
McDonald’s know 
how to make work 
fun (m=3.68) 
m=3.89 m=3.90 m=4.10 m=4.21 m=3.07 m=2.91 
Note: Likert Scale: 1(SD) …………… 5(SA) 
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At some point, before the short-term turns into the long-term, employees 
either leave their job voluntarily; or, inadvertently and/or carelessly breach a 
rule and are unable to continue their employment relationship (for example, they 
don’t turn-up for work). Hypothesis A raises the possibility of other phenomena 
including: employers will not invest in training those for whom there is no 
concept of a long-term; employers will not communicate their organizational 
development objectives to employees with whom they have a short-term 
relationship only; and, employers will not view short-termers as worthy of 
careers. It seems likely that, in accepting employees who merely comply, 
employers gain the advantage of increased labour flexibility. From a strategic 
management perspective, employers who offer jobs without a long-term make a 
trade-off between cooperation (beyond contract) and labour-flexibility.  
In relation to hypothesis A, Table 2 provides evidence that in cases where fast 
food workers do not conceive of themselves as having a career in the industry, 
they are less inclined to have a “beyond contract” commitment. For example, 
employees who indicate that they are not going to have a career indicate lower 
means for survey items 1, 2 and 3. Hence, compared to their peers who do want a 
career, employees who do not (or who do not expect to have one), show less 
initiative, are less comfortable dealing with unusual situations, and are less 
inclined to address minor problems autonomously. These findings hold 
irrespective of how long employees have been employed. However, in two out of 
the three survey items being considered, non-career employees who have been 
employed for longer than two years are slightly more inclined to show beyond 
contract style commitment than non-career employees who have been employed 
for less than two years. According to the six tenet conceptualization, this pattern 
of results could be interpreted as worker absence of a perception of a long term 
until they can see for themselves that the job will continue to be part of their life. 
Of course it is likely that certain employees— of their own volition— have no 
interest in working in the fast food industry in perpetuity. However, the fact that 
longer-term non-career employees seem to be more conscientious suggests an 
overall tendency for a perception/anticipation of an enduring employment 
relationship to be instrumental in generating employee cooperation.  
Hypothesis B suggests that, when considering new employment forms, 
notions of the long term are more abstract. This view suggests that employees in 
atypical jobs may, in certain circumstances, substitute anticipation of a long-term 
employment relationship with a more abstract conception; an employment 
relationship with an industry group. In such cases, these employees realize that 
they could have an affiliation into the long-term but it will be with several 
employers who may be associates or inclined to communicate with each other. If 
this is so, a more intangible relationship emerges which still figuratively retains 
social, economic and legal dimensions. The idea of an abstract employment 
relationship between an employee and an employing sector is an outgrowth of 
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recent theorizing by Cool, Henderson, and Abate (2005 pp. 1-15) who discuss the 
contemporary relevance of industry restructuring. Specifically, they argue that 
firms should not necessarily strive to remain viable and that, even from the 
perspective of a particular entity’s stakeholders, it is not necessarily desirable for 
that entity to continue in perpetuity.  
Data in Table 2 provide support for hypothesis B. Results presented in the 
first four columns about survey items 1, 2 and 3 suggest that employees with a 
broad desire to work in the fast food industry typically indicate greater 
cooperative behaviour than their peers who indicate a narrower commitment to 
McDonald’s work only. This pattern implies that, if an employee sees their future 
within the industry where they are currently working rather than exclusively 
with a particular employer, they will be inclined to exhibit beyond contract-style 
conduct. Such a phenomenon could be interpreted as evidence of a more abstract 
perception of the employment relationship on the part of certain industry-
committed workers.  
Hypothesis C is about changing definitions. In certain circumstances, notions 
of short and long term are truncated or redefined by employers of atypical 
workers. Such a strategy is likely to be implemented as a human resource 
management function. For example, the following management options could be 
interpreted as employer attempts to compel employees to condense their 
perception of the long-term: performance-based remuneration; short-duration 
employee training and development initiatives; formation of teams; and 
promotion and appointment based on merit rather than seniority. In each of 
these cases, advantages which would have once accrued only in the long term (in 
the industrial-age employment relationship) are potentially offered to employees 
more rapidly. In some cases the perception of advantage may be illusory. In 
these circumstances, it may be concluded that the human resource function 
centers on creating an impression of shorter timeframes rather than actually 
compressing short and long-terms.  
Table 2 presents evidence of human resource-related efforts to make 
timeframes shorter. Survey items 4, 5, and 6 indicate the possibility that benefits 
which, in the industrial-age relationship could only be obtained in the long-term, 
being experienced by those with less than two years of service. In particular, 
employees who want a career— or conceive of their job as having a long-term— 
are more inclined to consider that they are paid according to their individual 
work performance than employees who do not want a fast food career. This 
could be interpreted as these employees having a “compressed” perception of 
the short and long term. In Australia, the Fast Food Industry Award stipulates 
pay and terms and conditions for crew— and employers are disinclined to pay 
their workforce on the basis of individual performance (Gould, 2010, in print). 
However, perceptions of remuneration seem to be affected by an inclination to 
want to have a career— a phenomenon which could be influenced by human 
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resource-related strategy and rhetoric. A similar argument could be made about 
being offered more hours of work. Although employees who want careers may 
be generally better in the job— and therefore more likely to be offered work— 
the phenomena revealed in this survey item is about a general perception that 
good performance leads to more work. Employees who want careers perceive 
themselves as being able to control their access to work through better on the job 
performance. This inclination is enhanced for those who want a career and have 
more time in the job. Such a tendency is consistent with interest alignment 
increasing with time. Human resource managers who develop strategies to 
inculcate perceptions of interest alignment more quickly could be argued to be 
engaging in compression of short and long-term timeframes.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that the employment relationship exists in time has been largely 
overlooked in theorizing about the coexistence of conflict and cooperation. When 
notions of a job’s short and long term are used as a basis for understanding how 
interest alignment can be optimized, it is possible to better appreciate how an 
industrial-age employment relationship is sustainable. In the context of such an 
association, employees commence in a job in which they have non-aligned 
interests with their employer. At this stage, each party is held in check by 
compliance-related rules and regulations (for employees) and possibly unions 
(for employers). During the short term phase of the employment relationship 
there is no institutional pressure for beyond-contract-style cooperation on the 
part of employees and, where cooperation is observed, it arises because of the 
attitudes and/or ideological orientations of actors in the process. However, in 
time, greater alignment of interests arises. This occurs when it becomes clear that 
employees will continue the relationship they have with their employer and the 
mutual benefits of the association are manifest. At this point, an institutional 
basis for beyond-contract employee performance emerges. In practice, such a 
state may seldom exist; a phenomenon which makes the prospect of cooperation 
somewhat elusive. However it may be seen in a case where employees work 
hard to allow a firm to remain solvent and ultimately have the opportunity to see 
a link between their efforts and their job’s continued existence.  
The idea of time has special utility when it comes to analyzing new 
employment forms; forms which often entail a more limited conception of the 
long-term. For example, this study has presented data suggesting that there is an 
increase in cooperative behaviour when fast food workers perceive themselves to 
be in a long-term employment relationship. Such a tendency is more pronounced 
when workers conceive of themselves as having a relationship with an industry 
of employers rather than an individual employer. Evidence of this kind supports 
the six-tenet theory and, in particular, points to the possibility that interest-
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alignment optimizes over time. It was also suggested that human resource 
intervention may be considered as a device to manipulate conceptions of time 
and, in so doing, to create greater interest alignment— or at least the impression 
of interest alignment on the part of workers.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  In these circumstances, modern theory typically implies that such employers are still 
pluralist but view conflict in the employment relationship as best managed using 
human-resources–type interventions. 
2  Sometimes this investment may merely be words of encouragement or acceptable 
treatment. 
3  In the first issue discussed, the object of analysis is readily amenable to a closed 
research question which was previously identified as «what are the elements over which 
employers and employees have misaligned interests? » 
4  Concerns in this context equate to the notion of interests. 
5  A more elaborate view would be that employees differ with respect to the range and 
scope of elements that they want to control but that this difference is one of intensity. 
This would mean that, for a facet of a job affecting the employee who is doing that 
job, need for control will range from moderate to high— but will never be low. 
6  Here we are distinguishing dedicated development concerns from general 
development concerns. Dedicated development enables one to do a specific job 
whereas a general development enables one to perform better in a range of jobs.  
7  As opposed to being a framework for understanding the attitudes and strategic 
orientations of parties to the employment relationship. 
8  Such as overall high employee development concerns and overall low employer 
control concerns. 
9  This tenet is especially relevant in the second part of the article where it is proposed 
that, in contemporary work situations, it is not always present. 
10  The act of arriving at work would be an example of compliance.  
11  Temporary work, like other forms of non-standard employment, shows peaks and 
troughs in demand which roughly match the economic cycle. In times of recession, 
such jobs are the first to be abolished. However, there is a long-term overall trend 
towards increased use of temporary workers. 
12  The item used for disaggregation is “in five years time I would still like to be employed at 
McDonald’s/the fast food industry” (strongly agree….strongly disagree) recoded to a 
binary/dichotomous variable.   
13  Based on response to survey item “how long have you worked at McDonald’s?” 
recoded to a binary/dichotomous variable.  
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14  The analyses done to test hypotheses are mostly based on comparison of means. 
Although t-tests were carried out on these comparisons, to maintain the flow of the 
argument, these results are not reported. The testing of hypotheses via a comparison 
of means is not intended to be a detailed analysis but rather is intended to provide 
rudimentary evidence for the six-tenet time-based conceptualization.     
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